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Necroeconomics: How Necro Legacies Help Us 
Understand the Value of Death and the Protection 
of Life During the COVID-19 Pandemic  
Beverley Skeggs  
Abstract: »Nekroökonomie: Wie Nekro-Vermächtnisse uns helfen, den Wert des 
Todes und den Schutz des Lebens während der COVID-19-Pandemie zu verste-
hen«. The paper offers an analysis of how three historical legacies shaped the 
context for responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in England. They are firstly, 
necrospeculation, the ability to turn destructiveness into profit and produce 
new capitalist value. The second is the legacy of thanatocracy, the enactment 
of mass and organised killing as an official policy of the state. The third necro 
legacy, social reproduction, is not just about violent death and accumulation, 
but also the state’s divestment of responsibility to women for the protection 
of life itself. What these violent legacies have in common as they entwine 
throughout history is the continuing relationship between property, accumu-
lation, and disposable peoples, showing how economic and moral value is 
both captured and erased through abstract classifications of class, race, and 
gender. Bringing these legacies on a journey, we will see how they are modi-
fied and repeated in the present. Death during COVID-19 was used as an op-
portunity for speculation, consolidation of political power, and manipulation 
of the economy in the interests of the super-rich, government ministers, their 
friends, and the virus. True to neo-liberal philosophy, they “never let a serious 
crisis go to waste.” Their predatory practices led to many people being cal-
lously disregarded, neglected, and unprotected, exposing those considered 
to be surplus to state and capital requirements. The pandemic revealed that 
the social contract was broken as the matter of state responsibility for pro-
tection of the people was transferred by the government to individuals. The 
paper will also show how some groups attempted to protect others and save 
lives.  
Keywords: Capital accumulation, class, social reproduction, necropolitics, 
COVID-19, BAME, England, historical legacies, responsibility.  
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1. Introduction 
Stuart Hall’s (1974) framework of articulation, which combines historical 
specificity, abstraction, and lived experience, is used to analyse the current 
conjuncture. This framework enables us to see how historical inequalities of 
race, gender, and class come to be inserted into the present as active struc-
turing principles of life and death. To develop this framework, I draw on 
three historical legacies, the current COVID-19 context in England and par-
ticipation in two COVID-19 crisis response groups. The first legacy is “necro-
speculation” as described by Kris Manjapra (2019), who notes how the ability 
to turn destructiveness into profit and produce new capitalist value has a long 
history, especially evident in slave trading where anything, including death, 
was turned into a source of value, predatory value. He charts how the govern-
ment of the British Empire was adept at making profit from the death of those 
they did not consider to be human and/or productive enough to exploit 
through labour for surplus value. Instead, he details how the production of 
value depended on the purposeful wastage of black life. The second legacy 
can be traced from the Enclosure Acts in England and Wales, which began in 
1604 and included 5,200 different Acts of Parliament, appropriating common 
land so that people were deprived of their forms of livelihood. Those thrown 
off their land became (if fit enough) reduced to a source of labour for the Em-
pire, disposed and left to die if not. Peter Linebaugh (2019) details how this 
was a policy of thanatocracy, the enactment of mass and organised killing as 
an official policy of the state. The third legacy is about the responsibility for 
social reproduction, also born from death. Silvia Federici (2004) details how 
the medieval witch hunts, both in England and globally, not only killed thou-
sands of women in the name of patriarchal power but also crafted a new sex-
ual division of labour in which the allocation of responsibility to women to 
care for the family subjugated women’s labour and reproductive functions to 
the reproduction of the workforce. The reproducers of life were used and dis-
posed of in the interests of emergent capital. Class and race divisions were 
drawn between those who needed to labour to survive and those who did not. 
The three legacies are all violent processes for accruing monetary value and 
property to the powerful. 
These race, class, and gender legacies have shaped distinctive modes of 
capital accumulation, developing different techniques of violent value cap-
ture and erasure for different groups. Nascent processes of destruction, ex-
traction, exploitation, accumulation, and appropriation are developed as a 
result. One thing they all have in common is the continuing relationship be-
tween property, accumulation, and disposable people. Some groups have a 
long history of being treated as property: their designation as property en-
shrined in the laws that institutionalised classifications such as class, race, 
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and gender. For instance, Achille Mbembe (2019) traces a line from these 
necro-legacies to show how racialised groups have been repeatedly over time 
and space subject to state violence, which can include neglect as well as direct 
attack. These necro legacies fed into and developed through Liberalism and 
early classical political economy, as Warren Montag (2005) demonstrates. In 
the present, these ideas about who has value based on their potential for mon-
etary extraction also feed into neoliberalism’s ideas of human value, utilitar-
ianism, and responsibility. In their journey into the present, they take various 
routes through bio-power (Foucault, Davidson, and Burchell 2008), whereby 
Liberal governance becomes about protecting property and the effective con-
trol of populations by the state through the distribution of life and death. The 
necrolegacies produce a valorisation of death alongside the governance and 
distribution of life. I developed the theoretical framework after searching for 
an analysis that could make sense of the shape the COVID-19 virus was taking 
in England.1 
2. Lived Experience: Informing the Framework 
As the pandemic took hold in March 2020, I watched the elderly be laid to 
waste in unprotected care homes “as if expendable” according to Amnesty In-
ternational (2020). Trusted medics were also reporting high BAME (Black, 
Asian, and minority ethnic2) death rates on social media. These signals were 
 
1  The UK has devolved parliaments of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland with dif-
fering powers. Scotland and Wales differed significantly with their approaches to pandemic 
management. For the purposes of this paper, England is the focus. 
2  In the 1970s in the UK, a time of extreme violence against racialised groups, the term Black was 
used by racialised anti-racists to collectivise opposition to biological essentialism and institu-
tionalised racism and to recognise racial classifications as ideological, as “floating signifiers” 
(Hall [1981] 2021). Simultaneously a “multi-ethnic/multi-cultural” discursive strand was devel-
oping along liberal lines. According to Hall, it was assimilationist, a form of cultural essential-
ism, not oppositional to racism and was later named by Paul Gilroy (2021) as McKinsey corpo-
rate multiculturalism. BAME (Black, Asian, and minority ethnic) combines these different 
oppositional traditions, leading to what Claire Alexander (2018) argues is the fragmentation and 
de-politicisation of the term “Black.” The add-ons: Asian and minority ethnic, confuse the 
sources of racism by amalgamating of racist colour-classifications with geography, nationalism, 
religion, and culture and also through the increasing significance of identity in the political 
realm (see Hall [1981] 2021; Gilroy 2021). The problem is that classifications work in the interests 
of very different groups: racists, anti-racists, popular culture, academics, governments, and bu-
reaucrats. The amalgam BAME also normalises whiteness by conflating “non-white” groups to-
gether but ignoring racialised white groups such as Travellers. It is also a non-performative ac-
ronym that is used by institutions to signal their recognition of “diversity” whilst simultaneously 
cloaking and reproducing the racism of the institution (Ahmed 2012). It is highly contested by 
the people to whom it is applied. So why is it used here? When drawing on official statistics, it is 
often the only way to make visible and recognise the significance of racialised classifications 
that are often ignored in studies of inequalities (hence the use with COVID-19 data that initially 
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also accompanied by multiple stories of corruption by government ministers. 
I had lived through austerity, the decimation by privatisation of the NHS, and 
the financial experiments being developed in social care (all with deadly con-
sequences for my own family) and was alert to similar patterns emerging 
(Skeggs 2017). It appeared as if the government was operating with a value 
assessment of specific groups whose lives were considered as disposable, def-
initely not considered worthy of protection. Lockdown was late, care homes 
were not protected, and no protections were offered to key workers. But 
nonetheless, deaths did become a lucrative source of economic and political 
value for both extracting profit and extending power and influence. This was 
made possible by the issuance of government contracts for ineffective PPE 
equipment (£10 billion spent), hopeless software systems (e.g., Test and 
Trace, £37 billion spent) and faulty testing laboratories.3 Peter Geoghegan 
(2021) and The Good Law Project 4 continue to expose how PPE contracts are 
processed through a secret VIP list, with the majority of contracts given to 
members of the government, their families, friends, and £881m worth to 
eight Conservative party donors. The National Audit Office have reported 
“alarmingly widespread levels of procedural impropriety.”5  
Following the necro-legacies of colonialism and the imperative of neoliber-
alism to “never let a serious crisis go to waste” (Mirowski 2013), the govern-
ment clearly proved to be very capable at facilitating the economic and polit-
ical gain to be made from COVID-19 deaths. However, they were incapable of 
protecting those made vulnerable, either through age and/or structural ine-
quality, often because of past government policies of impoverishment, rac-
ism, and depletion by austerity. It was not only a lack of health provision and 
care protection and/or austerity impoverishment that was killing these 
groups but also employment practices, such as being forced to labour in 
 
did not break down deaths by racialised classification). However, it completely obfuscates the 
relationship between class and racialised classification, which was once subject to significant 
interrogation (e.g., see the archive of Ambalavaner Sivanandan). Hall (1980, 341) understood 
that “race is the modality in which class is ‘lived’, the medium through which class relations are 
experienced.’’ They are lived very differently because of Britain’s long colonial history, which 
creates very different geopolitical race/class articulations. Class cuts through differently racial-
ised groups differently and it would indeed be clunky writing that listed how this manifested for 
different minoritised ethnicised groups: in 2009, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development identified over 217 different nationalities living in the UK, some of whom are 
working class and some who are not. Adding the adjective BAME to the descriptor working class 
as “BAME working class” would not only normalise the working class as white but also create 
some problematic associations by including elites into the working-class definition. Hence the 
use of working class/BAME when referring to generalised data on inequalities. 
3  See the BBC Undercover documentary “Inside the Covid Testing Lab.” https://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
iplayer/episode/m000tqjj/panorama-undercover-inside-the-covid-testing-lab (Accessed 30 
March 2021). 
4  The PPE Fiasco. https://goodlawproject.org/case/procurement-case/ (Accessed 18 May 2021). 
5  BBC News Report by Rachel Shraer “Covid: PPE price rises cost taxpayers £10bn, National Audit 
Office report says.” https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-55061183 (Accessed 25 November 
2020). 
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dangerous conditions. The COVID-19 virus was facilitated through callous 
disregard and malevolent neglect, making the government appear to be 
working in the interests of the virus itself, which ultimately led to the highest 
confirmed COVID-19 death rate globally at the time of writing.6  
It was in the midst of my astonishment at government incompetence and 
corruption that in April 2020 I was invited to join two different crisis response 
groups in the North-West of England: a city council BAME (Black, Asian and 
minority ethic) cell and ADASS (Association of Directors of Adult Social Ser-
vices). The former was established through its links to Public Health England, 
local medics, social service providers, and community workers who were al-
ready alert to the higher death rates of BAME populations across their region. 
The latter (ADASS) group was trying to work out how to provide support for 
those on the frontline of many types of care provision (care homes, informal 
and social work provision). My role in both was as an advisor, not as a re-
searcher. Both were struggling to work out the best ways to respond to the 
pandemic. Both groups educated me in crisis management, in national-local 
state relationships, in the complexities of working in an environment with so 
many sub-sub-private contractors for labour and provision, in the lack of care 
and health provision available and in dealing with shock, frustration, and ex-
haustion. The sheer determination of these groups to protect the vulnerable 
was extraordinary.  
I conducted a survey of crisis provision for ADASS. It was non-funded and 
urgent, a scoping analysis of what was needed, what was available, and how 
useful identified provision could be to the different types of care workers (see 
Skeggs and Lambert 2020). It was conducted online with targeted interviews 
enabled through the different representatives in the group, with care and so-
cial workers, unions representing care workers, and social service providers. 
The high levels of anxiety among the workers, managers, and providers were 
exacerbated by the lack of, and contradictory, government advice. Nobody 
knew what to do. The workloads and lack of protection reported by those 
working in care homes was extraordinary. The main solution discovered for 
supporting workers in dangerous environments was a monetised telephone 
app, in fact many telephone apps were on offer to assess one’s anxiety. Find-
ing so many monetised “support systems” was a research revelation: govern-
ment failure had been monetised. 
The BAME cell included medical researchers who were rapidly compiling 
statistics across the region to send to the government and were skilled at rapid 
response research. We would spend hours on the screen trying to identify 
patterns of death, which revealed problems with how COVID-19 deaths were 
 
6  https://www.statista.com/statistics/1111779/coronavirus-death-rate-europe-by-country/ (Ac-
cessed 29 April 2020). They key word here is “confirmed.” On 29 April 2021 (at the time of writ-
ing), other countries have higher “reported” but not confirmed death rates. On 20 May 2021 (at 
the time of revision), Peru, Hungary, Brazil, and India had passed the British feat. 
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reported. It also included experienced political campaigners – public health 
officials and community representatives – who knew how to present to the 
public on complex issues. But how do you tell your own community that they 
are dying at a faster rate than their white counterparts? Protection strategies 
and campaign communications became central to the group who worked 
with local Imams and other community leaders to present information with 
sensitivity. Yet this indomitable and relentless group struggled with the over-
whelming experience of facing death in every aspect of their lives. The expe-
rience of the frontline actions from groups determined to protect life was so 
very different to the media reporting of the crisis. 
The then Health Secretary (Minister) claimed he had put a “protective ring” 
around care homes,7 and “PPE has been provided across the county” was also 
a regular statement from the Prime Minister.8 Yet all representatives from 
both groups were reporting this was definitely not the case. People were us-
ing scarves and even welding masks to protect themselves. The reporting of 
high BAME death rates was not reported at all early in the pandemic. The 
“Disparities Report” (Public Health England 2020) – euphemistically named 
with no mention of race – which contained all the statistics and analysis of 
racialised COVID-19 deaths, was embargoed by the government and only 
published after a campaign from BAME groups, including the one I was in.  
I include these vignettes of experience as a participant observer, not as part 
of a funded research project, but in terms of how they shaped research ques-
tions and informed the framework of conjunctural articulation: 1) Why were 
certain groups more vulnerable? 2) Why was the government lying about pro-
tecting care homes and PPE generally? 3) Why did the media not hold the gov-
ernment to account? 4) Where was all the COVID-19 crisis money going? It 
was these questions that initially pointed me back to Mirowski’s (2013) trope 
“never let a serious crisis go to waste,” about the opportunism and institution-
alisation of neoliberalism, which then led me to further dig into legacy anal-
ysis of state sanctioned death and capital accumulation. To be clear, this is 
not a detailed historical investigation but is about building a sociological 
frame that considers what we can learn from history to help us understand 
and respond to the present. 
3. Historical Legacies of Value Extraction 
If we begin with Manjapara’s (2019) definition of “necrospeculation” – the 
ability to turn destructiveness into profit and produce new capitalist value 
through death – we see that using death as an opportunity for capital 
 
7  https://fullfact.org/health/matt-hancock-protective-ring-care-homes/ (Accessed 08 June 
2021). 
8  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/53443161 (Accessed 17 July 2021). 
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accumulation shapes the state institutions that we currently inhabit. State in-
stitutions enshrined early forms of necrospeculation, of monetising death. 
For instance, the British Empire insurance industry was legitimated by state 
law to codify the death of certain groups as potential monetary value. Jeremy 
Krikler (2007) charts the Zong massacre in 1781, whereby the Zong, a slave 
ship, left West Africa carrying 470 African slaves for sale in Jamaica. By the 
time it reached the Caribbean, an epidemic – probably of dysentery produced 
through neglect – raged on board, killing scores of slaves and some of the 
crew. Because of a navigation error by the captain, the ship passed its desti-
nation, and with water supplies running low a decision was taken by the cap-
tain to throw overboard those slaves deemed too ill to survive or too damaged 
to be sold in the slave-markets of Jamaica. Over 130 slaves were put to death 
by being thrown alive and shackled overboard. This, apparently, was not un-
usual in the slave trade of flesh (Krikler 2007).  
The ensuing legal cases, adjudicated by Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, were 
made through property law, as an insurance case, that cast the slaves as chat-
tel, not human. In 1783, a first trial – purely on the matter of insurance – 
found in favour of the slavers, i.e., that they did the right thing to throw the 
slaves overboard to protect their remaining value/cargo. The insurers ap-
pealed, bringing the matter to court again. Note this was a battle between the 
slave owners and insurers over their costs. This was because the value of 
slaves was only known and legislated through their economic value (dead or 
alive).  
It took some time, as Ian Baucom (2005) notes, for slaves to be registered as 
non-chattels, as legal persons, as human. This, Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2002) 
argues, is a practice of abstraction, a death-dealing displacement of differ-
ence into hierarchies which produces our contemporary racist classifica-
tions. She notes how processes of abstraction organise humans in relation to 
inhuman persons in a hierarchy that produces the totalising category of the 
“human being.” This legacy is not only carried into mainstream Anglo law, as 
legal theorists have since shown, but also into every pore of our culture, in 
evaluations of whose life matters, who counts, and in the current conjunc-
ture, defines who will be protected from COVID-19. Person-value is produced 
daily through numerous processes of classification, evaluation, and institu-
tionalisation, which distribute moral and economic value to specific groups 
as if they were property (Skeggs 2011). For instance, Cheryl Harris (1993) 
charts how in law and criminal justice systems, whiteness is made “as-if” it is 
a property, shaping hierarchies of personhood in all state institutions. David 
Roediger (1991) details historically how racialised hierarchies of classifica-
tion shape occupational classifications. Additionally, Colin Dayan (2011) 
charts how categories of legal non-personhood work in present legal systems, 
enabling state sanctioned death, punishment, and torture of those still not 
considered to be human. De-humanising, objectification, and de-legitimation 
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are key to the daily operations of racism. Necrospeculation shows how the 
entangled relationship between economic value, classification, and person-
hood become institutionalised in government, law, and financial systems 
shaping one of the major lines of articulation that fed into the pandemic: the 
extraction of economic and political value from lives made by histories of rac-
ism. 
That the necrospeculators of the British Empire were legitimated through 
the support of state institutions should not surprise us as many were mem-
bers of the government; only property owners could hold a seat in Parlia-
ment. The Virginia Company is a classic example and shows not only the en-
twined state-capital interests but also the emergent race/class configurations. 
The Lord Chief Justice of the Kings Bench from 1592 to 1604 was the leading 
organiser of the colonist Virginia Company. As Linebaugh and Rediker (2000) 
detail, the company benefitted from the laws that criminalised those who 
were starving and impoverished as a result of the Enclosure Acts. The crimi-
nalised were classified into different value potential as labour, ready for 
transportation to build slave colonies in America. If they had no potential 
value, they were disregarded and left to starve. It is from this state legitima-
tion of monetary interests that necrospeculators become institutionalised.  
Achille Mbembe (2019) argues that we need to think of institutional politics 
as the work of death by the state. Knotting death, labour, and race together 
for the purposes of economic value extraction and moral value degradation 
has a long history. As Wilson Gilmore (2002) further notes, racism is the state-
sanctioned or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated 
vulnerability to premature death. It is also, Lisa Tilley (2020) argues, why one 
of the main responses to the COVID-19 pandemic is shaped by eugenics. 
Mbembe maintains that the state holds the right to impose civil or social 
death depending on one’s position in the racialised hierarchy of person-
value. Neglect by design and callous disregard in the face of a global pan-
demic is not new, it builds on the long history of racism put into effect by the 
British Empire. 
Death was always central to the spatially dispersed logics of Empire: on a 
global scale it was a logic of purposeful disregard in one space to ensure ac-
cumulation elsewhere. As Mike Davis (2001) notes, the Victorian Holocausts 
(1876–1897), which resulted in 30-60 million people being killed in famines all 
over the world, were mainly concentrated in India. British colonialists, sup-
ported by the British government, imported India’s grain harvest into Britain 
to be sold on, knowing it would kill millions. As Davis shows the accumula-
tion premised on death was accompanied by the theological application of 
the sacred principles of Liberalism.  
Even Keynes, often held as a proponent of social democratic policies and a 
classic Liberal, was also an eugenicist. He applied the theology/ideology of 
utilitarianism and its method of “political arithmetic” to model and estimate 
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the likely profit from death. Michelle Murphy (2017) details how Keynes’s ar-
gumentations that colonial immunisation projects in India were misguided 
because he believed that reductions in population caused by death from 
plague in the Punjab were correlated with increased wages and prosperity in 
the generation that followed. Death from plague for Keynes became a “benef-
icent visitation,” a calculation of long-term progress. 
When the “Disparities Report” was finally published (PHE 2020), it revealed 
the higher death rate for BAME groups in proportion to white groups. In par-
allel with the rapid response research by Abdul Razaq et al. (2020), it found 
that Black excess deaths (observed vs expected) were 4.5 times higher for the 
Black African population, 3 times higher for the Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
population, 2.5 times for the Black Caribbean population, and 1.5 times 
higher for the Indian population. Mixed excess deaths are 2 times higher. 
Overall people of Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, Other Asian, Black Caribbean, 
and Other Black ethnicity had between 10 and 50% higher risk of death when 
compared to White British. The reasons were multifactorial: firstly, BAME 
communities have a high presence within the NHS workforce at all levels 
with more than 50% of healthcare workers who died being from BAME back-
grounds. Of 262 social care workers deaths, 53-60% were BAME groups. Eng-
land and Wales have the second highest number of health and social worker 
reported deaths from COVID-19 in the world (although it is likely India has 
surpassed these figures). Certain groups are also more likely to be in multi-
generational housing and be geographically located in areas of socio-eco-
nomic deprivation.  
4. Thanatocracy 
In parallel another legacy emerges, namely what Peter Linebaugh (2019) 
identifies as a long history of thanatocracy. This is a general history of the 
development of the English working class whose survival was determined by 
their ability to labour in order for value to be extracted and appropriated. 
Marx (1967) details how the individual capitalist attempts to extend workers’ 
production by extracting every minute of energy and time, which ultimately 
shortens the life and use of the worker. The struggles of the English working 
class to protect themselves from exploitation have been extensively docu-
mented, not least by E.P. Thompson (1966). Liberal humanism obscured the 
contradictory dynamic between the protection and disposability of labour 
through the myth of “freedom to exchange” one’s labour. The only “freedom” 
was to die if labour was not exchanged. Some protection of life was enabled 
through charity offered by local parishes, but it was rarely enough against 
brutal exploitation and death. It was local organising, riots, and social unrest 
that led to the first legal protections, such as the Poor Law of 1834. 
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However, allowing the source of labour to die or be depleted through bare 
survival proved to be counterproductive to value extraction, social order, and 
the production of human artillery for Empire projects over the long-term. A 
shortage of labour for the Boer War and the First World War led to the estab-
lishment of a nascent welfare state between 1906 and 1914, which was de-
signed to create a labour supply, to produce a war-ready healthy population, 
and to offset likely social unrest. The many initiatives developed to feed, ed-
ucate, and house the working class were subject to frequent challenges from 
the governments of the time, with strict boundaries redrawn (from the 1834 
Law) between the categories of deserving and undeserving. 
It was only with The Beveridge Act of 1944 – which established the formal-
ised Welfare State, designed to rid the population of moral diseases such as 
idleness and ignorance, alongside generating a healthy population – that the 
state fully institutionalised its responsibility for health and welfare. It was es-
tablished by a Labour government with an aim to generate full male employ-
ment. It was underpinned by both Eugenics and patriarchy: The Act ad-
dressed the working class as if they were totally white, with a duty to 
“maintain their breed at its best” (1943, 161, as quoted in Shilliam 2018, 75). 
And, as Denise Noble (2015) notes, (white) women were specifically allocated 
the role of reproducing racism, ensuring the adequate continuance of the 
“British race” and of “British ideals in the world.” Through a variety of differ-
ent laws, women were not only allocated the responsibility for social repro-
duction but also, if they were working-class, were subject to the state surveil-
lance of their “standards” through health, education, and welfare institutions 
(Skeggs 1997).  
The welfare state and organised protection, predominantly by trade unions, 
alongside local charities and mutual aid, offered some defence against brutal 
exploitation. The destruction of that protection began with a vengeance in 
1977 when the Conservative party commissioned The Ridley Report, a report 
into how to destroy the most powerful British trade union – the National Un-
ion of Mineworkers. The report’s recommendations were put into effect in 
1984 by the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher with the help of the army, 
the police, and the law. The welfare state was simultaneously subject to the 
first round of austerity cuts.  
It was also in the early 80s that the symbolic delegitimation of the working 
class began with a vengeance where adjectives such as “feckless,” “undeserv-
ing,” and “idle” were reintroduced by government and media to describe the 
working class (Skeggs 2004). This delegitimation was further developed by 
successive Labour and Conservative governments (Skeggs and Loveday 2012) 
and became central to the political and moral economy of media output from 
the 1990s onwards (Skeggs and Wood 2012). 
It was the Conservative party who in 2010, with the support of the Liberal 
Democrats, introduced further systemic austerity policies designed to cut 
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public spending, including welfare. Since then, £18 billion has been cut from 
welfare support in the UK.9 The British Medical Journal estimated that over 
120,000 excess deaths were caused by austerity.10 Of these 111,000 were “ben-
efit deaths,” including 17,000 disabled people, due to late welfare payments 
as a result of austerity policies.11 Although the time span is much longer – 10 
years – this total is nearly as many as COVID-19 deaths, currently standing at 
153,734 in the UK.12 The patterns between austerity and COVID-19 deaths are 
similar: disabled people are also more susceptible to COVID-19 deaths. The 
UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) reported that between 24 January and 
20 November 2020 in England among women, the risk of death was 3.5 times 
greater for “more-disabled women” and 2.0 times greater for “less-disabled 
women” when compared with “non-disabled women.”13 
In the UK in 2020, women in the most deprived areas were 133% more likely 
to die from COVID-19 than those in the least deprived areas (Stafford and 
Deeny 2020). Deprivation produced through austerity policies also signifi-
cantly impacted upon life expectancy (Dorling 2019). The effects of austerity 
have been extensively documented (Dowling 2020). Histories of class, gender, 
and institutionalised racism combine in multiple ways making presentation 
for health and social care less likely (Marmot et al. 2020; Razaq et al. 2020) and 
death more likely.  
Austerity was a product of the legacies of necrospeculation and thanatoc-
racy that had killed and depleted specific groups of people in the interest of 
capital accumulation. It was the institutions of social reproduction that were 
relied upon to offer some protection. 
5. Social Reproduction 
The entangled third historical legacy that directly feeds into the response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic is that of social reproduction, generally defined as 
life-making activities. Silvia Federici (2004) details how today’s regime of so-
cial reproduction is premised upon the allocation of responsibility to women 
to care for the family. By subjugating women’s labour and reproductive 
 
9  https://www.ft.com/content/5fcbd0c4-2948-11e5-8db8-c033edba8a6e (Accessed 17 Novem-
ber 2021). 
10  https://blogs.bmj.com/bmjopen/2017/11/15/health-and-social-care-spending-cuts-linked-to-
120000-excess-deaths-in-england/ (Accessed 17 November 2021). 
11  https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/pip-waiting-time-deaths-disabled-peo-
ple-die-disability-benefits-personal-independence-payment-dwp-a8727296.html (Accessed 17 
November 2021). 
12  https://coronavirus.data.gov.uk/details/deaths (Accessed 17 November 2021). 
13  https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/death 
s/articles/coronaviruscovid19relateddeathsbydisabilitystatusenglandandwales/24januar-
yto20november2020 (Accessed 17 November 2021). 
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functions to the reproduction of the work-force, social reproduction appears 
as if private. She maintains that the nuclear family form was the state’s first 
bio-political form, used to control the supply of labour and discipline the 
workforce. It is social reproduction that enables capital accumulation to pro-
ceed: it forms the infrastructure of caring, feeding, housing, security, social-
ising, educating, and repairing that enables labour to come into existence and 
survive, replenished daily for exploitation. The nuclear family form enables 
devolved responsibility from the state. 
Institutionalised social reproduction is a matter of responsibility-transfer: 
In England the national state transfers its responsibility to the local state, 
which then transfers its responsibility to the household structure, who then 
if unable to take responsibility transfers it to anyone who can. If there is no 
one to take responsibility, people die. Since the 1970s the responsibility has 
often been outsourced to migrant workers, who support health and care pro-
vision. Sara Farris (2015) identifies the reserve army of migrant labour, the 
majority of whom are women, who take on the work of social reproduction 
for both the state and middle-class families. The sexual division of labour en-
twines with the classed and raced division of labour and, as Susan Ferguson 
(2008) argues, shows how racism and sexism are not historical aberrations but 
are integral to capital, actively facilitating processes of capital accumulation. 
Isabella Bakker (2020) also demonstrates how, in the present, social repro-
duction is interlinked within a neoliberal rationality that prioritises economic 
growth and market logics over all other activities. 
However, taking familial responsibility for social reproduction is fraught 
with contradictions, operating as not just fundamental to capital accumula-
tion, the often-violent oppression of women and the state surveillance of 
working-class women, but also as a key site for the protection of workers. Jo-
hanna Brenner and Maria Ramas (1984) demonstrated how campaigns for a 
“family wage” (a male breadwinner) in the late 1800s came about not just 
through the external imposition of a sexual division of labour but also 
through struggle, as the working class organised their own protections 
against the rapacious desires of capital to expend every source of energy. 
Likewise, Hazel Carby (1982) has shown how the family can be an important 
site of solidarity for both Black women and men, a legacy developed from 
slavery. Alternative structures of social reproduction, such as queer “families 
of choice,” have often been developed to protect those regularly subject to 
violence from the state and beyond.  
We can see how these different mechanisms of exploitation and defence 
played out through the pandemic. Often disregarded in medical and epidemi-
ological reviews, the responsibility for social reproduction is a compounded 
factor towards exposure to COVID-19. Many working mothers caught in a 
care sandwich – caring for both young children and the elderly – were dispro-
portionately exposed to the virus through extended responsibilities. If this 
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responsibility took place in a multi-generational household, most likely to be 
BAME, the risk of catching COVID-19 was high (Razaq et al. 2020). The 
Women’s Budget Group (2020) reported that most women, especially BAME 
women, were struggling to cope.  
Formal paid care labour was exceptionally exposed. Most of the adult care 
workforce who are paid are also unpaid carers too. In the scoping project I 
did, many care workers had been threatened by wage withdrawal and job 
loss. The Trade Union Congress report (TUC; 2021) on insecure work found 
that of the total 1.6 million UK adult social care workers, 685,000 home care 
workers are paid by the minute on zero hour contracts,14 often employed by 
outsourced agencies. During the pandemic they were forced to go from house 
to house and, because of the lack of PPE, they spread infection.15 Almost two 
thirds (64%) of unpaid carers have not been able to take breaks from their 
caring role since the pandemic began (TUC 2021), and most have struggled to 
find support that would enable them to work, as both external child and el-
derly care support was both difficult to find and afford (Barker 2020). 
Those who had previously paid privately for others to do the work of social 
reproduction had to take the responsibility back: nannies and domestic work-
ers were often not allowed to enter private houses for fear of contamination. 
And the combination of school and childcare facility closures, plus loss of in-
formal care networks, led to increased responsibility, specifically for moth-
ers: in households with a child aged under 5 years, women did on average 
78% more childcare than men.16 The ability to outsource social reproduction 
responsibility was further compounded by the effect of Brexit in January 
2020, creating an even more acute shortage of health and care workers. 
The Women’s Budget Group (2020) has shown how women are not only 
overrepresented in occupational sectors that have been hardest hit by lock-
downs – such as hospitality, child-care, and tourism – but also make up 77% 
of the 3.2 million workers in “high risk” roles such as medical staff, carers, 
and cleaners, who are also more likely to be BAME. The TUC (2021) also found 
that 70% of furlough requests (to be released from full-time work on 80% pay) 
from working mothers were turned down by their employers (Barker 2020).  
A key institution of social reproduction, the health system, was unable to 
cope due to years of underfunding prior to the pandemic (Buckingham and 
 
14  Zero-hour contracts are contracts that do not guarantee an employee hour while requiring 
availability for work.  
15  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/18/agency-staff-were-spreading-covid-19-be-
tween-care-homes-phe-found-in-april (Accessed 17 November 2021). 
16  https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/conditions 
anddiseases/articles/parentinginlockdowncoronavirusandtheeffectsonworklifebalance/2020-
07-22 (Accessed 19 November 2021). 
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Dayan 2019); out of 33 OECD countries, only 3 had fewer hospital beds than 
the UK,17 with an acute shortage of nurses, especially in deprived areas.18  
Along with mothers, it was up to charities such as the 1,300 Trussell Trust 
foodbanks to do the work of social reproduction: between April 2020 to March 
2021, 2.5 million emergency food parcels were given to people in crisis, of 
which 980,000 of these went to children. Food need has increased by 123%.19 
Many Mutual Aid groups (4,300) were established and over 400,000 people 
joined the NHS as volunteers in one day, contributing to the total 750,000.20 
Repeating history, protection comes from local organising against the irre-
sponsibility of the national state. The long history establishes patterns that 
are repeated in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, revealing how the dy-
namic of abuse and disregard for life can be set against the struggle for sur-
vival and protection. 
6. Knotted Necrolegacies 
The violent lines from the necrospeculators, thanatocracy, and patriarchal 
power that stretch and entwine from the fourteenth century into Liberalism 
are now the DNA of neoliberal capitalism. As Mbembe (2019, 30) notes: 
The abolition of slavery represents an important moment in the consolida-
tion of liberal statecraft, as it deployed biopower to make live and let die, as 
well as necropower to capture surplus from the ongoing death-making 
practices of the state. The emergent British scavenger state converted old 
corruption into gentlemanly capitalism and old monopoly into new liberal-
ism. And it did so not by consigning the dead to the past but by a necroman-
tic feeding on the ongoing vibrancy of the dead and destroyed.  
Debates about who should be protected, the bio-politics of life and death, 
have been made explicit: Toby Young, ex-member of the Board of the Office for 
Students, tweeted that “spending £350 billion to prolong the lives of a few hun-
dred thousand mostly elderly people is an irresponsible use of taxpayers’ 
money.”21 The former Supreme Court Justice and advisor to the Conservative 
party, Lord Jonathan Sumption, declared some “lives less valuable,” referenc-
ing the elderly as an unnecessary cost to the economy, and Jeremy Warner, a 
 
17  https://www.health.org.uk/news-and-comment/charts-and-infographics/did-hospital-capac-
ity-affect-mortality-during-the-pandemic (Accessed 17 November 2021). 
18  https://www.nursingtimes.net/news/workforce/nhs-nurse-vacancies-in-england-rise-to-
more-than-43000-08-10-2019/ (Accessed 08 October 2019). 
19  https://www.trusselltrust.org/news-and-blog/latest-stats/end-year-stats/ (Accessed 08 Octo-
ber 2021). 
20  https://www.england.nhs.uk/2020/03/over-400000-people-join-nhs-army-of-volunteers-in-
one-day/ (Accessed 17 November 2021). 
21  Toby Young (@toadmeister). 2020. “spending £350 billion to prolong the lives of a few hun-
dred thousand mostly elderly people is an irresponsible use of taxpayers’ money.” Twitter, 
March 2020, Tweet has been deleted. 
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journalist for the conservative Telegraph newspaper, wrote, “from an entirely 
disinterested economic perspective COVID-19 might even prove mildly ben-
eficial in the long term by disproportionately culling elderly dependents” 
(Roberts 2021). Right-wing commentary is one thing, but a leaked WhatsApp 
message (from 15 October 20) from the Prime Minister to his former senior 
advisor made public by the BBC opposed the third English lockdown on the 
basis that those dying were “all over 80.”22 Letting those less economically ex-
ploitable and a cost to the state (via pensions) die is clearly considered from 
the highest rank in government to be legitimate. Didier Fassin (2009) names 
this classification and calculation nexus “biolegitimacy” as it is based on the 
power to calculate “who shall live and what sort of life and for how long” (53). 
The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR; 2021) reported that spending on 
state pensions will fall by £1.5 billion by 2022. The government will also re-
ceive an extra £0.9 billion from inheritance tax due to COVID-19 related 
deaths. The abstraction and objectification of life and death are discussed by 
the media and government representatives as if people were not involved and 
dead pensioners were a benefit to the nation. Further biolegitimation is 
achieved through the reification of “the economy” as an abstract “good thing” 
by right-wing think tanks such as the Institute of Economic Ideas (IEI) who pro-
pose the use of “formal” calculations such as QUALY (quality adjusted life 
year). QUALY, a measurement specifically designed to judge the cost of med-
icines to life expectancy, was transformed by the IEI to “model life” through 
a “cost-benefit analysis” of lockdown in order to identify and “exploit ineffi-
ciencies” (J. Jessop 2020), a byword for non-profit making activities and those 
regarded as “depotentialised life” (Cooper 2008). 
Yet the elderly, the “depotentialised,” have been repotentialised for some 
time through experimentation in value extraction that moves beyond tradi-
tional labour exploitation into the realm of financial extraction – financiali-
sation, where financial services are used to generate profit for financial com-
panies. Hedge fund investment in care homes for debt loading and asset 
stripping are well established (see Burns et al. 2016; Horton 2019). Personal 
debt and private insurance are other means by which financial services can 
reap a profit through elder social care. Pension funds are also a huge source 
of “liquid” capital in the extraction of fees by financial companies (UNISON 
2016). Clearly the traditional Conservative commentators have yet to catch up 
with the financialisation experiments promoted by their government that ex-
tract profit from the exceptionally vulnerable. The increased significance of 
predatory financial capital – via debt – in all our lives highlights a return to 
the necrospeculators, and the “variegated” forms of capital that exist simul-
taneously searching for new sources of extraction (B. Jessop 2014). As 
Mbembe notes, the techniques used against Black people throughout history 
 
22  See Laura Kuenssberg “Agree with him of not, Dominic Cummings’s words matter” 19 July 21 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-57894745. (Accessed 19 July 2021). 
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are extended to other groups made vulnerable for predation and experimen-
tation. 
7. Conclusion 
If we take the long view, we can see the articulation of the many elements 
that come together in the COVID-19 conjuncture. The necrolegacies of Em-
pire still haunt: necrospeculation and thanatocracy shape the lack of protec-
tions afforded to BAME/working-class populations. The structure of social re-
production not only provides the infrastructure that enables capital 
accumulation but also offers some protection from COVID-19 for some. The 
licenced larceny, state institutions, and legitimation that emerged from these 
violent legacies draw a line into the present. The politics of predation, Eugen-
ics, experimentation, and entitlement to another’s labour or care, fundamen-
tal to the establishment of industrial capitalism, enfolded into the biopolitics 
of the Liberal-to-neoliberal state are alive and well. The people who have 
been subject to them are not.  
The English government has been practicing, normalising, and institution-
alising “failing forward for some time” (Jones 2020; Peck 2010), perfecting the 
techniques of a state that extracts rather than protects, one that has system-
atically weakened those it considered to be disposable whilst also facilitating 
their financialisation. The “crisis of care” has been identified for decades 
now, as the elderly and vulnerable die from not just the pandemic but also 
austerity and vulnerability (The Care Collective 2020; Dowling 2020). They 
have been subject to callous disregard, malevolent neglect, opportunism, and 
predation. The ability to create chaos appears to be a purposeful political 
strategy as the incompetent and inept proved to be exceedingly capable of 
capitalising upon a serious crisis. They have brazenly drawn both money and 
power to themselves throughout the pandemic, exposing the failure of the 
social contract, as the protection of the populous was converted into a matter 
of individual responsibility. The recourse to individual responsibility is also 
something that the other contributions to this HSR Forum point to in the 
country contexts they analyse. 
The social classifications developed through the violent distribution of 
value though property, exploitation, and disposability are inherited through 
an accident of birth. This inheritance distributes the predisposition to death 
by the virus. The pandemic has revealed how class contempt, racism, ageism, 
and patriarchal power underpin the institutions and infrastructures of gov-
ernment. Entwined processes of classification distribute not just moral and 
economic value to specific groups but also distribute life and death chances 
(Skeggs 2011). Class privilege offers strong protection against COVID-19 for 
some groups. The amalgam BAME contains stark class differences, most 
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visible in the government that has been generating the COVID-19 policies out-
lined above, where ironically as BAME people die at a much higher rate, there 
are more BAME senior ministers than ever before in history.23 Mothers of all 
classes have had to increase their social reproduction responsibility, but 
again class privilege offers some protection with greater access to the means 
for securing health, housing, food, safety, and education. The historical dy-
namic between the brutal disregard for life can be set against the struggle for 
survival and protection. This is class, race, and gender as the motor of a very 
long history. 
This is why I want to pull all these legacies into a framework that stresses 
the economic dimensions of state sanctioned death: necroeconomics. Lives 
could have been saved, painful deaths avoided, and grief and trauma abated. 
The long legacies of necrospeculation, thanatocracy, and social reproduction 
should have alerted us to how the pandemic was likely to play out. Now that 
we can see the juggernaut of necroeconomics proceeding apace we need to 
pay attention to its operations elsewhere such as in the ecological destruction 
that is repeating the same patterns of callous disregard and malevolent ne-
glect as the reckless opportunists continue to refuse to take responsibility. In 
the historical struggle between abuse and disregard versus protection and 
care, the question now is how do we protect ourselves and others against the 
pandemic predators and rebuild a world that is being so savagely broken? 
That is if we survive. 
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